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ABSTRACT
The question of the legal nature of the European Union (hereafter: the EU) has been 
left unanswered to date. Determining the legal nature is important for predicting 
the consequences, limits and ways of action of any organization, including the EU. 
Today, the EU is most often defined as a sui generis organization. Given the limited 
analytical value of the term sui generis, it is important to determine its content. For 
this purpose, it is necessary to analyze, along with the political aspect of the commu-
nity, the formal and legal ones, which includes the analysis of federal, international 
and other elements contained in the legal and political system of the EU. 
Also, a comparison between the formal and political elements of the EU and a typ-
ical federal society such as the United States of America will be made, with the aim 
of determining the specific features of the EU which prevent it from being called “the 
United States of Europe”. The most prominent definitions of the EU offered by prom-
inent theorists will be briefly addressed in this article.
KEYWORDS: EU, sui generis, federation, international organization, US federal 
system, prominent theoreticians
1. INTRODUCTION
 “E. Burke said that political orders do not occur on drawing boards, but they 
must be allowed to occur”.1
The establishment of the European Community (hereafter: the EC) in the sec-
ond half of the 20th century implied the necessity for determining the political 
and organizational elements of the system.  
*  PhD Candidate at University of Zagreb, Faculty of Law; katarinaperocevic@gmail.com.
1 Posavec, Z.: A path towards a united Europe, Politička misao, vol. 28 (1) 1991, p. 6. 
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At that time, discussions regarding legal nature were conducted both in Eu-
rope and in the United States of America (hereafter: the USA), and opinions 
varied.2 The State Department concluded that the new united Europe should 
have a primarily economic role, while in Europe there were various ideas, 
from the Federalist, the Social democrats to the Unionists, the opponents of 
institutionalization.3
The European Union of today emerged on the foundations of the European 
Coal and Steel Community, perceived at that time as an international organi-
zation, with an increasing number of federal elements.
History shows that development from the EC, mainly an economic system, to 
the EU, an economic and political system, progressed rapidly. There are many 
factors that either provoked or influenced the changes of the legal nature of the 
EU. The following can be adduced as influential formal factors: the changes of 
EU Treaties, changes in the institutional organization of the system, changes in 
the decision-making process, alteration of types and effects of EU legislation, 
modifications of EU competences, enlargement of the community and so on.
Moreover, the following can be adduced as influential political factors: the 
creation of policy guidelines from institutions such as the European Court of 
Justice (hereafter: the ECJ) and the European Council, which the legal nature 
of the EU is largely modelled on. The question which remains unanswered is 
whether the formal factors affect the change of the legal nature of the EU or 
the abovementioned factors are changing due to influential political factors. 
The following analysis of the formal legal and political elements from the 
emergence of the European Community until today will be an attempt to an-
swer that question, as well as the aforementioned one: What is the content of 
the term sui generis?
2 Vukadinović, R. et al., European integration policy, Zagreb, 2005, p. 52
3 The concept of federal Europe was advocated by Robert Schumann, Jean Monnet, Walter 
Hallstein, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi. They presented their ideas at the Hague Con-
gress (1948) that was attended by around 700 delegates from 16 countries and was important 
for the issue of the character of the new community. Vukadinović, R. et al., European integra-
tion policy, Zagreb, 2005, p. 52.
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2.  LEGAL AND POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF THE LEGAL 
NATURE OF THE EU
2.1. ESTABLISHMENT OBJECTIVES AND FOUNDING TREATIES 
“Force enemies to jointly build the castle and you’ll turn them into brothers”.4
States form organizations and alliances for a variety of reasons; however, his-
tory shows that the most common motive is defense, that is, the desire to defend 
oneself against an external enemy. Unlike in a typical confederation in which 
states create a new subject of international law for the purpose of self-defense, 
the EC was established with the aim of integration in the economic field.5
In the 1950s, the EC was considered to be a typical international organization 
or confederation, established by an international treaty which can be amended 
only with the approval of all Member States. At that time, the EC consisted of 
two separate communities, each with its own legal capacity and two areas of 
international cooperation. It was not authorized to enter into any agreements, 
including with third countries, which was the element that differentiated it 
from international organizations and confederations.6
In the 1990s, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht, the change 
of the Founding Treaties resulted in serious discussions of the EU as a feder-
al state. European integration led from predominantly economic integration 
to political unity, and the sovereignty of Member States was a key issue for 
the organization of the EU legal system. The objectives of the economic and 
monetary union, the single currency, the common foreign and security policy, 
the common defense policy, and the close cooperation in the field of justice 
and home affairs were all regulated. The Treaty of Maastricht sought to unite 
the economic, monetary and political dimension of the EU. In response to 
the changes, the German Constitutional Court rendered the Maastricht Urteil 
judgment in which it raised the issue of control over decision-making in the 
EU. It concluded that the source of legitimacy in the EU decision-making pro-
cess are the citizens, and the Member States are the ones who decide on the 
transfer and conferral of their competence to the EU.7 It called the European 
4 Mintas Hodak, Lj., European Union, Zagreb, 2010, p. 2.
5 Degan, Đ.: Confederalism, Politička misao, vol. 28 (2) 1991,  pp. 7 - 8.
6 Under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union has acquired legal personality and the in-
ternational legal capacity to conclude contracts with third countries or international organiza-
tions. Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, (OJ C 326, 
26/10/2012) Art. 3; Art. 47.
7 Bonechi, G.: The Legal Nature of the European Union: a Federal Approach, Luiss Guido 
Carli – Libera Universita internazionale, 2015, p. 33.
Intereulaweast, Vol. IV (2) 2017
104
Union “Staatverbund”, which means “the state alliance”. In that sense, the EU 
would be a confederation.8 
That judgement was aimed at confirming the non-federal character of the EU, 
considering that there is no intention of creating “the United States of Europe”. 
Under the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, the EU was focused on changes in 
the functioning of the institutions and the acceptance of new member states. 
These Treaties opened the way for the adoption of the European Constitution.9 
The Convention on the Future of Europe has raised issues of importance re-
garding the legal nature of the EU, such as the way of applying the federal 
principle, the question of shared sovereignty, national identity, and autonomy 
of the Member States.
As a result of the debate, a Constitutional Treaty was adopted which did not 
come into force as it was rejected in referendums in the Netherlands and 
France in 2005. The Lisbon Reform Treaty, which entered into force in 2009, 
provided the EU with legal personality and international legality. Although 
not formally confirmed, these changes have led to the predominance of federal 
elements in the EU. 
2.2. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
For decades, EC decisions were made according to the intergovernmental 
principle, unanimously, on the principle of equality, as in international organi-
zations. The establishment of the European Council brought about change by 
strengthening the position of the Council and by enacting a qualified majority 
vote, thus enabling the EC to assume a federal element. The EU decides unan-
imously on important issues such as changes in the organization, changes of 
the EU Treaty and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the 
budget and so on. Thus, there is a mixture of federal and confederal elements 
in the decision-making process.
8 Case 89 BVerfGE 155 [12/10/1993] Bundesverfassungsgericht.  
9 Baletić, M.: Legal Characteristics of the process of creation and enlargement of the Euro-
pean Union, Međunarodne studije: časopis za međunarodne odnose, vanjsku politiku i diplo-
maciju, vol. 6 (2) 2006, p. 23.
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2.3. ACTS AND THEIR LEGAL EFFECT IN THE EU
In federal systems, acts are binding on member states, but this is also possi-
ble in countries that accept the monistic concept of international treaties.10 
In international organizations acts have the force of recommendations and 
are not binding on member states. In a confederation, the citizens of mem-
ber states shall not be bound by the decisions made by confederation bodies 
until they enter their legislation. Citizens do not have direct relations with 
confederal bodies but have direct relations with the bodies of member states, 
as is the case in the European Union. The EU issues binding legislation, ex-
cept for recommendations and opinions. The EU has two instruments which 
have a direct impact on EU citizens. The first are Regulations which have a 
general and direct effect and are binding in their entirety. Decisions are the 
second instrument, and they are binding in their entirety. The Regulations 
and the Decisions would represent federal elements because of their binding 
effect, while the Directives, which need to be “embedded” in the national 
system of member states in order to produce an effect, represent a confeder-
al, international element.11 
2.4. EU MEMBER STATES
Unlike international organizations, the EU can only have States as members, 
and there is no possibility for an international organization or other legal entity 
to become a member. In contrast, members of international organizations can 
be states, international organizations and other entities, which make the EU 
more similar to the federative system.
2.5. COMPETENCES
Having started as a community with purely economic goals, the EU is increas-
ingly developing as a political union, gradually expanding its competence to 
issues that are part of the States’ elements and belong to the area of States’ 
sovereignty. The Lisbon Treaty stipulates that the EU acts in accordance with 
10 Ćapeta, T., European Union courts – Courts of EU Member States as european courts, 
Zagreb, 2002, p. 10. 
11 Bonechi, G.: The Legal Nature of the European Union: a Federal Approach, Luiss Guido 
Carli – Libera Universita internazionale, 2015, p. 29.
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the powers conferred on it by the Member States.12 However, the activism of 
the ECJ and the political guidelines of the European Council are to a great 
extent responsible for the expansion of EU competences on questions such as 
fundamental rights and defense.
The competences of the EU are wider than in international organizations since 
they are not exclusively technical and specific but rather more general. How-
ever, this is not a consistent criterion for legal differentiation between suprana-
tional organizations such as the EU and international organizations.13
2.6. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE IN THE EU
The EU contains a mixture of intergovernmental and supranational institu-
tional features which has made it peculiar from its beginnings.14 Initially, it 
was based on co-operation between the governments of the Member States, 
the decision-making center was the Council of Ministers as a representative of 
the national executive authorities, making the community similar to a typical 
international organization. In the 1960s, co-operation intensified, the Europe-
an Parliament developed into an important decision-maker and the European 
Commission became an institution that would represent the executive power, 
though not in a typical manner.
The European Council carries out the function of the Head of State and con-
tributes to the federalization of the European Union, as does the ECJ.15 
All these institutions contributed to the emergence of a political union, whose 
mix of intergovernmental and supranational features some call a hybrid system.16
2.7.  THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY
While EU Member States transfer part of their sovereignty to supranational 
bodies, in confederations and international organizations the states retain their 
sovereignty. In its judgment in Costa v. Enel, the ECJ held that “the Commu-
12 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, (OJ C 326, 
26/10/2012) Art. 5. 
13 Orakhelashvili, A.: The Idea of European International Law, The European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 17 (2) 2006, p. 343.
14 Magnette, P., Political system of the European Union, Biblioteka Politička misao, Pariz, 
2009, p. 199. 
15 Ibid., p. 231.
16 Ibid., p. 199.
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nity has rights deriving from the restriction of the sovereignty of the Member 
States.”17 Member States thus lose the ability to exercise their rights that are 
usually associated with the concept of sovereignty.18 
Paul Magnette regards the question not to be whether states lose or share sov-
ereignty within the Union, but only how the sovereignty of the Member States 
is exercised in different ways within the network of institutions, norms and 
principles.19 Some believe that sovereignty, defined as one and indivisible, de-
nies the federal solution and that the dual nature of the EU is thus obscured.20 
Saurugger believes that the federalist approach to sovereignty needs to be 
abolished in order to create a new political system in which powers and sover-
eignty will be divided between different subjects and levels of governance. 21
The Constitutional Courts of the Member States react differently to the issue 
of sovereignty within the EU. The Italian Constitution stipulates that “Italy 
agrees with the limitation of sovereignty necessary to ensure peace and justice 
between peoples.”22 The German Federal Constitutional Court states that “The 
Federal Republic of Germany participates in the European Union as an asso-
ciation of sovereign States to which sovereign powers are transferred. Autho-
rization to exercise sovereign powers comes from the Member States. States 
permanently remain “custodians of the Treaties.”23 The ruling by the Polish 
Constitutional Court stated that “it is not enough to say that the European 
Union is considered as supranational organization - a category that the Polish 
Constitution has not foreseen. Member States remain sovereign entities - mem-
bers of the Founding Treaties and the European Union.24 According to Branko 
Smerdel, the Republic of Croatia should find an example in the practice of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court and the constitutional courts of other 
States which have developed a theory of constitutional identity that stipulates 
that, contrary to the theory of full supremacy of all sources of European law 
17 Case C-6/64 Costa v Enel [1964] ECR 585  
18 Van Rossem, J. N., Between Autonomy and Dependence, The autonomy of EU Law: More 
is less?, The Netherlands, 2013, p. 26.
19 Magnette, P., Political system of the European Union, Biblioteka Politička misao, Pariz, 
2009, p. 15.
20 Bonechi, G.: The Legal Nature of the European Union: a Federal Approach, Luiss Guido 
Carli – Libera Universita internazionale, 2015, p. 34
21 Saurugger, S., Theories and concepts of european integration, Biblioteka Politička misao, 
Paris, 2009, p. 87.
22 The Constitution of the Italian Republic, (Official Gazette no. 298), Art. 11.
23 Case 2 BVerfGE 2/08 [30/06/2009] Bundesverfassungsgericht.  
24 Case K 18/04 [11/05/2005] Polish Constitutional Tribunal
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over domestic law, including national constitutions, decisions must be made 
based on domestic constitutional law.25
The principle of subsidiarity is one of the mechanisms which allow the Mem-
ber States to avoid the question of sovereignty and one of the fundamental ele-
ments the understanding of which allows us to see how and to what extent the 
federal (supra-national) government delegates more power to the lower level 
for the purpose of federal policy implementation.26 Countering the two basic 
levels of government is an essential feature of the federal system and one of the 
most visible dimensions of political life. 27
An important factor in determining the legal nature and economic and politi-
cal development of the EU is the ECJ. Its judgments change the nature of the 
organization and affect social, cultural and economic changes to the organi-
zation.
2.8. ACTIVISM OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
In the 1950s, the European Community was considered a largely international 
organization. Member States needed to determine the relationship between 
their own legislation and the community legislation, so they interpreted the 
provisions of their legislation in relation to the community legislation as well 
as the relation of domestic law to the international law.28 That is how the Com-
munity law was interpreted. Although concluded as international treaties, EC 
treaties have eventually taken on a constitutional character based on the rule 
of law. 29
25 Smerdel, B.; Croatian constitutionality in the European Union – Appeal of the Eurorealist, 
Studia lexicographica, vol. 5 (1) 2011, p. 15.
26 Saurugger, S., Theories and concepts of european integration, Biblioteka Politička misao, 
Paris, 2009, p. 98.
27 Magnette, P., Political system of the European Union, Biblioteka Politička misao, Pariz, 
2009, p. 20.
28 Ćapeta, T., European Union courts – Courts of EU Member States as european courts, 
Zagreb, 2002, pp. 3 - 4.
29 The ECJ found in the Les Verts case (Case C-294/83 Les Verts v European Parliament 
[1984] ECR 1339) that the European Community is based on the rule of law. The Community 
institutions and the Member States cannot avoid the question of whether the measures taken 
comply with the constitutional order of the Member States and the Founding Treaties. The 
ECJ interprets the Treaty and must be able to maintain the EU “institutional balance”.  D’Sa, 
Rose, M., The Legal and Constitutional Nature of the New International Treaties on econom-
ic and monetary union from the perspective of EU Law, European Current Law Issue, vol. 5, 
2012, p. 23.
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The judgments of the ECJ Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. Enel have changed 
the perception of Community law from largely international to federal. The 
Van Gend en Loos judgment defines Community law as “a new order of inter-
national law in which the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, 
albeit in a restricted area, and whose subjects are not only the Member States 
but also their citizens.”30 
The Community is defined as a new order of international law, which is more 
than a contract exclusively aimed at mutually agreed obligations between the 
contracting parties. 31
In Costa v. Enel judgement, the ECJ has defined the community as a sepa-
rate legal system, emphasizing its specific and original nature. The EC system 
must be autonomous because if national law were to take precedence over the 
Treaties, then the EC’s own foundations would be questioned.32 “The EEC 
Treaty has created its own legal system... Member States have restricted their 
sovereign rights, although in limited areas, and thus created a legal system 
which is obligatory for Member states as well as for their citizens.”33 By trans-
ferring jurisdiction and limiting the sovereignty of the Member States and 
by establishing direct effect and principles of supremacy, the Community has 
come closer to the federal order. The EU Court has taken a step towards the 
constitutionalization of the EC.34
As a reaction to change, the German Federal Constitutional Court described 
the EC in its 1967 judgment: “The community is neither a state nor a federal 
state. It is a Community of a specific nature in the process of closer integra-
tion into an intergovernmental organization in accordance with Article 24 of 
Grundgesetz by which the Federal Republic of Germany, in communion with 
other Member States, has transferred some sovereign rights.” 35 The new body 
was established, autonomously and independently from the public authorities 
of all Member States.36
30 Case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1  
31 Orakhelashvili, A.: The Idea of European International Law, The European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 17 (2) 2006, p. 343.
32 Van Rossem, J. N., Between Autonomy and Dependence, The autonomy of EU Law: More 
is less?, The Netherlands, 2013, p .18.
33 Case C-6/64 Costa v Enel  [1964] ECR 585  
34 Stone Sweet, A.: The Structure of Constitutional Pluralism, Yale Law School Faculty 
Scholarship, vol. 11 (2) 2013, p. 494.
35 Case BVerfGE 22 [18/10/1967] Bundesverfassungsgericht.   
36 Czuczai, J., The autonomy of the EU legal order and the law-making activities of internation-
al organizations. Some examples regading the Council most recent practice, Brugge, 2012, p. 3.
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The importance of the supremacy of Community law over national law has 
also been confirmed in the Simmenthal case in which the ECJ emphasized 
that “provisions of national law which are contrary to Community law are 
non-applicable.”37 In the Internationale Handelsgesselschaft the ECJ found 
that “the validity of EC law is assessed solely in the light of Community law 
and is within the jurisdiction of the ECJ.”38
Principles of supremacy are accepted by the courts and governments of Mem-
ber states. The basis for the establishment of the principle of superiority of 
Community law was found by the ECJ in the autonomous and specific order of 
the Community, while national courts accepted the principle of supremacy as 
a constitutional consensus between the Member States. The Custodians of the 
Treaty are still Member States and the Community has an obligation to respect 
it.39  The EU is defined as a sui generis system, a separate legal system with its 
own characteristics and specifics. 
The abovementioned judgments were a big step towards EU federalization. 
The changes in the functioning of the EC happened because of the activist 
role of the ECJ, and not because the Member States had reached an agreement 
on this issue beforehand. However, these changes were later accepted by the 
Member States. 
3. EUROPEAN UNION AS A US FEDERATION?
The development of the European Community went in the opposite direction 
from compared to the United States. The idea of a federal system has been 
present in the United States since its establishment, while in the European 
Union it was just one of many possibilities.40  Theoreticians of Europe have 
traditionally rejected the idea of a federal union like the one in the American 
constitutional tradition.41 The EU was created a long time after the emergence 
of states in Europe which had already developed their national identity, bu-
37  Case C-106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 
629.
38  Case C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH [1970] ECR 1125.
39 Kwiecien, R.: The Primacy of European Union Law over National Law under the Consti-
tutional Treaty, German Law Journal, vol. 6 (11) 2005, p. 1495.
40 Magnette, P., Political system of the European Union, Biblioteka Politička misao, Pariz, 
2009, p. 15.
41 Bonechi, G.: The Legal Nature of the European Union: a Federal Approach, Luiss Guido 
Carli – Libera Universita internazionale, 2015, p. 24.
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reaucratic apparatus and a broad spectrum of public policies.42 In the United 
States, both levels of authority emerged at the same time, only one decade 
passed between the adoption of the Declaration of Independence of Former 
Colonies and the creation of the federal system, which makes the analysis of 
the balance between the EU and its Member States more difficult than that of 
the United States.43
The EU is not a State because it does not fulfill the conditions foreseen by 
international law.44 It was established based on contracts between sovereign 
states and not by sovereign citizens.45 The US Constitution was “made up of 
citizens”, while the EC Treaties have been ratified by various national legisla-
tors.46 European constitutional architecture has never been confirmed by the 
European “demos”. According to Alexis de Tocqueville, the main objective of 
the US Constitution was to divide the sovereignty into two parts: one should 
control the interests of the community, while the other should control the in-
terests of the constituent States.47 Federalism implied dual government, dual 
sovereignty and dual citizenship.48
The Federation was easier to achieve in the US as there were no deep cultural, 
religious, and ethnic divisions in these areas. Alexis de Tocqueville thinks that 
four conditions were met for the success of US federalism. These are customs 
of local self-government, a common language, a political class dominated by 
lawyers and common moral convictions.
In the US, a large number of people of different nationalities accepted the lan-
guage of the majority as the official language. Some see the lack of a common 
language as the most difficult barrier preventing the EU from becoming a 
federal community. If we consider the common language to be crucial for the 
42 Magnette, P., Political system of the European Union, Biblioteka Politička misao, Pariz, 
2009, p. 17.
43 Ibid.
44 Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Obligations of the States pro-
vides: The State as a subject of international law should have the following characteristics - 
permanent population, defined territory, government, the possibility of establishing relations 
with other states. Although the EU fulfills many of these conditions, it is clear that Member 
States have not ceased to exist as separate states. Wessel, Ramses A., Revisiting the Interna-
tional Legal Status of the EU, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 5, 2001, p. 523. 
45 Bogdanor, V., European Studies at Oxford,  Federalism and the nature of the European 
union, Oxford, 2003, p. 53.
46 B Bonechi, G.: The Legal Nature of the European Union: a Federal Approach, Luiss Guido 
Carli – Libera Universita internazionale, 2015, p. 25.
47 Bonechi, op. cit. p. 13.
48 Ibid. 
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creation of a federation, it is almost impossible to create a federal European 
system in the EU.49
The US institutional structure does not differ essentially from that in the EU. 
The United States Constitution established the Congress as the legislative body, 
composed of a House of Representatives representing the “national” body and 
the Senate, representing an “international” body.50 In the EU, the European 
Parliament whose members are elected by citizens would be a “national” body, 
while the Council would represent an “international” body. The ECJ is the 
“Guardian of the Treaty”, which is also the role of the US Supreme Court. The 
differences are obvious in the way of voting, appointment of judges and the 
possibility of giving separate opinions. 51 The ECJ gradually started to decide 
on disputes of a political nature.
Differences between the US federal system and the EU system are in some part 
visible in the division of competences. While the US has classical sovereign 
competences in the area of  foreign policy and defense, the EC primarily acted 
for the purpose of economic integration, first with the common market, and 
then with the common currency policy. However, that is changing since the EU 
is expanding its competences on issues such as defense and also through the 
creation of a common foreign policy, although this still not comprehensive as 
there is a diversity of opinions amongst the Member States regarding foreign 
affairs as well.
Cultural, political and economic conditions in the EU vary among different 
Member States. The EU and its Member States do not have a unique cultural 
identity, and Member States are afraid of losing theirs. In addition to cultural 
differences, there are also linguistic differences, social structures are quite dif-
ferent as well, and among some Member States there is a fear that a federally 
structured EU will lead to the disappearance of traditional states and cultures. 
EU Member States have all elements of nationality, different traditions and 
cultures, which distinguishes them from the US states. 
The brief analysis shows that although there are similarities between two com-
pared systems, EU is still not federalized in complete. Moreover, there is no 
chance that it will be federalized completely in the near future, since its politi-
cal balance is very much questioned, which is not the case in the United States. 
49 Podolnjak, R.,: The creation of the European Constitution as a “quasi-constitutional mo-
ment”’, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, vol. 55 (6) 2005, p. 1440.
50 B Bonechi, G.: The Legal Nature of the European Union: a Federal Approach, Luiss Guido 
Carli – Libera Universita internazionale, 2015, p. 27.
51 Magnette, P., Political system of the European Union, Biblioteka Politička misao, Pariz, 
2009, p. 137. 
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4. THEORETICIANS ON THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE EU
Most of the theoreticians who see the Union as an international organization 
will not deny that the EU has some federal characteristics.52 It is usually con-
sidered as an atypical model of an international organization based on inter-
national treaties, which remain international even when they are amended and 
changed.53 For them, the fact that it is a supranational organization does not 
exclude the possibility of it also being an international organization.54 Paul 
Magnette believes that the European Union is more integrated than a classical 
international organization in terms of scope of cooperation and imposed legal 
and political obligations, but it guarantees its members greater autonomy than 
those of federal states.55 
Guggenheimm sees the EU as an autonomous system of rights that exist par-
allel to national and international legal systems. 56
Jacques Dolores views the European Union as an unidentified political ob-
ject.57
Branko Smerdel believes that it is a complex community that has its own his-
torical precedents and comparative examples.58 Wessel considers the EU to be 
a community that represents a compromise between intergovernmental and 
supranationalist approaches. He uses the term “layered international organi-
zation”.59 Wallace believes the EU is less than a federation, more than an in-
ter-state regime.60
52 Van Rossem, J. N., Between Autonomy and Dependence, The autonomy of EU Law: More 
is less?, The Netherlands, 2013, p. 25.
53 Ibid.
54 Orakhelashvili, A.: The Idea of European International Law, The European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 17 (2) 2006, p. 343.
55 Magnette, P., Political system of the European Union, Biblioteka Politička misao, Pariz, 
2009, p. 17. 
56 Orakhelashvili, A.: The Idea of European International Law, The European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 17 (2) 2006, p. 343.
57 Ziller, J., The Nature of European Union Law, u Tratado de Derecho de la Union, Madrid, 
2011, p. 60.
58 Smerdel, B.; Croatian constitutionality in the European Union – Appeal of the Eurorealist, 
Studia lexicographica, vol. 5 (1) 2011, p. 7. 
59 Wessel, Ramses A., Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU, European Foreign 
Affairs Review, vol. 5, 2001, p. 536.
60 Magnette, P., Political system of the European Union, Biblioteka Politička misao, Pariz, 
2009, p. 192.
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5.  CONCLUSION
The importance of determining the nature of the EU is manifested in a prac-
tical sense, as by providing definitions of phenomena and systems, we allow 
them to be more easily recognized and we are ready to see the advantages and 
disadvantages of each of them. If we do not know all characteristics of system, 
we can easily be drawn into the manipulations that the system can entail and 
which can be detrimental for democracy. The development of the European 
Union was characterized by periods of development and stagnation, and the 
question of the legal nature of the EU was one of the decisive factors that in-
fluenced the development of integration itself. From our brief analysis of the 
main political and legal determinants of the EC and the EU, we can conclude 
that the formal factors affect the change of the legal nature of the EU but these 
factors are also changing due to influential political factors. They represent the 
mixture of confederal and federal elements and form the content of the term 
sui generis, which is created on both legal and political levels. The changes 
on each level are reflected in the change of the content of the term sui generis.
The sui generis term represents a special organizational form with its own 
specific features. Since it contains characteristics that are specific and untypi-
cal, the concept of sui generis requires a thorough analysis to determine what 
it means. In the previous sections, the legal and political elements which were 
analyzed in comparison to federal, confederal and other elements, shows that 
the EU has the characteristics of each of these systems but not in their entirety. 
The sui generis concept serves as a term to define a mixture of all features, 
including those that are not characteristic of any of the foregoing systems.
Since some of the Member States advocate the federal organization of the EU, 
while some want to strengthen sovereignty and thus the confederal elements, 
the sui generis represents a successful compromise between the former and 
the latter. However, such an approach has its shortcomings since the term itself 
has no analytical value and historical significance. Sui generis does not mean 
the state, the super-state, nor the international organization, or any other form 
of international cooperation. It represents a unique system that cannot be com-
pared in its entirety with existing systems. The term sui generis avoids the un-
ambiguous answer to the question on which there is no consensus and an exact 
response to which could lead to political, economic and cultural consequences 
for the Member States.
We can conclude, there are no “United States of Europe” but there are many 
EU concepts. Some still see it as a confederal organization and want to limit 
the development of the EU as a federal community. The Confederal concept 
still has great support among Member States, and the reason is the preserva-
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tion of the sovereignty of Member States. On the other side, the federal con-
cept of the European Union has been advancing for decades and, as has the 
role of the ECJ as a supranational court body. For some, it is an organization 
sui generis that avoids unequivocal qualifications of the EU such as a federal 
state or an alliance of states. With no final answer to this important question, 
it remains open for future analysis.
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